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THE "BIG ANTITRUST CASE": THOUGHTS ON
PROCEDURAL REFORM
JoHN S. KINGDON*
Despite the adoption of case management techniques such as the pre-
trial conference, computerized litigation support systems and consolidated
multiparty/multidistrict litigation, the "big antitrust case" continues to
overwhelm the federal courts., Case management techniques have helped
parties gain better control over their own cases and have reduced much of
the trial time once devoted to complex litigation; but they have not ad-
dressed-and to a certain extent they have exacerbated the length and
complexity of the pretrial stage of complex litigation. As a result, even
when a complex case is settled or judicially disposed of prior to trial,
massive amounts of the parties' and court's time and financial resources
* Attorney, Washington, D.C.; A.B., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Vir-
ginia, 1966. The author and his firm, Howrey & Simon, Washington, D.C., have participated
as counsel in some of the cases cited herein.
I In addition to the 1979 Report of the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust
Laws and Procedures, discussed in this article, the problem of managing the big antitrust
case has received widespread attention. See ABA SECTION ON LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DiscovERY ABUSE (Oct. 1977); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
JUDICIAL CONTROL AND THE CvnL LITIGATION PROCESS: DiscovERY (June 1978); SECOND Cmcurr
CoMnssION ON THE REDUCTmON OF BURDENS AND COSTS IN Cim LITIGATION, VOLUNTEER MASTERS
PILOT PROGRAM (April 10, 1978); Byrnes, Discovery: Its Uses and Abuses - The Defendants'
Perspective, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 14 (1975); Complex Antitrust Cases: Need They Always Drag
On?, 786 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. AA-1 (Oct. 26, 1976); Demkovich, The Clogged
Federal Courts - Who Are The Culprits?, Nat. L.J. (Feb. 11, 1978); Durham & Dibble,
Certification: A Practical Device for Early Screening of Spurious Antitrust Litigation, 1978
B.Y.U. L. REv. 299 (1978); Griffin, Big Civil Case and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 49
TEMPLE L.Q. 898 (1976); Halverson, Coping With the Fruits of Discovery in the Complex Case
- The Systems Approach to Litigation Support, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1975); Handler, The
Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits - The Twenty-Third
Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1971); Harris & Libesman, Can The Jury
Survive the Complex Antitrust Case?, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REv: 611 (1979); Kirkham, Complex
Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976); Kurland,
Discovery: Its Uses and Abuses - The Plaintiffs' Perspective, 44 ANTrRUST L.J. 3 (1975);
Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Louis]; McElroy, Federal Pre-Trial Procedure in an Antitrust Suit, 31
Sw. L.J. 649 (1977); National Institute on the Corporate Trustbusters, Workshop IV: Patents,
Technology and Antitrust, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 215 (1973); Newman, Limiting the Antitrust
Damage Suit: The Emergence of A Policy Against Complex Litigation, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REv.
253 (1977); Pollack, Pretrial Procedures More Effectively Handled, 65 F.R.D. 475 (1974);
Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159 (1976); Symposium, How
Government Cases Get Selected - Or Why Me?, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 562 (1977); Withrow &
Larm, The "Big"Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNELL L. Rv. 1 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Withrow & Larm]; Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the
Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1978); Note, Masters and Magis-
trates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. REv. 779 (1975); Note, Pretrial Discovery in Anti-
trust Cases, 8 MEMPHs ST. U. L. Rxv. 615 (1978); Note, Improved Definition of Discovery
Relevance: A Path Out of the Antitrust Procedural Quagmire, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 751 (1978).
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continue to be absorbed in the pretrial processes of partial issue resolution,
discovery and fact-marshalling.2
A "worst case" example of exhaustive pretrial complexity is Waldron
v. British Petroleum Co.,3 an action alleging an antitrust boycott and
conspiracy among oil ,companies during the early part of the 1950's. The
complaint was filed in 1956. During the first twelve years of pretrial mo-
tions litigation, there-were two substitutions of plaintiffs because of the
deaths of the original and intervening plaintiffs. Summary judgment for
one defendant was a~hieved in 1968, but by 1971, fifteen years after the
complaint was filed and twenty years after the first activities complained
of occurred, plaintiff still had not begun general discovery. Another exam-
ple of the exhaustive demands of complex antitrust litigation is the govern-
ment's ongoing prosecution of IBM for monopolization of the computer
industry.4 After several years of pre-complaint investigation, the Justice
Department filed the suit on January 17, 1969, over ten years ago. Little
happened for three years. Most of the following three years was consumed
in pretrial battles over the alleged destruction of work-product materials.'
In July 1973, IBM moved for an early separate trial to settle the issues of
relevant markets. The court, however, believed such a procedure would not
completely resolve any of the issues of the complaint and denied the mo-
tion.' By January 1975, computer technology had advanced far beyond the
scope of the litigation. The equipment whose market was embraced by the
original complaint was antiquated in comparison with newer IBM prod-
ucts. As a result, the government found it necessary to modernize its com-
plaint to embrace allegations involving the new "plug compatible peri-
pherals" equipment. Updating the complaint imposed additional discov-
ery demands and burdens as a prelude to trial.'
2 Statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts demon-
strate that on the average less than ten percent of antitrust actions reach trial. About forty
percent are settled and approximately fifty percent are disposed of judicially each year.
However, other Administrative Office statistics show that even pretrial dispositions can still
be exhausting. During Fiscal Year 1973, the median duration of private actions judicially
terminated prior to trial was 10 months; ten percent took 45 or more months for resolution.
During Fiscal Year 1974, the medial duration of judicially terminated antitrust actions in-
creased to 16 months, and ten percent of them took 60 or more months for resolution. See
Judicial Conference of the United States, Reports of the Proceedings: Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts: 1973 Report, Tables C-4
at 358-59, c-5a at 368-69; 1974 Report, Tables C-4 at 415-16; C-5a at 428-31.
3 38 F.R.D. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd sub nom. Waldron v. Cities Service Co., 361 F.2d
671 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
See also First Nat'l Bank v. British Petroleum Co., 324 F. Supp. 1348, 1361-62 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), where the appendix outlines pretrial proceedings in the case spanning 15 years.
' United States v. IBM Corp., Civ. No. 69-200 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed Jan. 17, 1969).
' See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 62 F.R.D. 530 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 493
F.2d 112 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 416 U.S. 995 (1974).
United States v. IBM Corp., 60 F.R.D. 654, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Many other examples of exhaustive pretrial proceedings exist. See generally Withrow
and Larm, supra note 1.
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Somewhat overlooked in the literature are the even grander complexi-
ties of the antitrust cases brought by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
before its own administrative law judges. Not only are these cases prose-
cuted under courtroom and procedural rules more rdlaxed than the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus subjected to fewer procedural mecha-
nisms of control, but they are also far more ambitious in scope. For exam-
ple, the FTC's two largest cases, the Exxon case,' seeking to restructure
the oil industry, and the Kellogg case,' charging the new structural theory
of "shared monopoly" in the cereals industry, virtually defy manageability
because of the scope of their claims for structural relief in complex indus-
tries.
The Exxon complaint, filed in 1973 after almost eight years of pur-
ported investigation, alleged that the eight major oil companies main-
tained a "non-competitive market structure." To substantiate that charge,
the FTC issued an 1800-page subpoena duces tecum. The requested docu-
ments dated back to the early part of the century and the demand was
world-wide in scope. After six years of litigation over the massive scope of
that request, the companies were given 18 months to search millions of
documents in response to a revised staff subpoena."° That discovery is
presently continuing. The government estimated at one point that it would
be prepared to go to trial as early as 1983, ten years after filing the com-
plaint and eighteen years after initiating its investigation of the industry.
This estimate was based solely upon the uninterrupted time the agency
estimated it would need to sift through this document production and to
prepare its case for trial. The FTC maintains that the- industry should
delay any of its discovery until after the FTC has presented its case before
the administrative law judge, which might not occur until the late 1980's.
Respondents' discovery and the presentation of the defense will take sev-
eral more years. Present estimates are that the trial will extend into the
1990's-more than seventeen years after the filing of the complaint.' Once
the administrative law judge reaches his decision, the Commission itself
will review the massive record. Even at this "early" date, the government
already has expended over $13 million on the Exxon proceeding.,'
The Kellogg case has consumed comparable government and private
In re Exxon Corp., FTC Docket No. 8934.
In re Kellogg Co., FTC Docket No. 8883.
"Order Ruling on Motions to Limit and Quash Subpoenas at 14, In re Exxon Corp., FTC
Docket No. 8934 (Issued Jan. 12, 1978).
,1 Testimony of Michael Pertschuk before House, Co'mm. on Appropriations, Subcomm.
on Depts. of State, Justice and Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (March 18,1979) (remarks of Mr. Dougherty). See also Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade
Comm. 588 F.2d 895, 902 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[B]oth the appellants' and the FTC's counsel
appear to concur in the estimate that ... the ultimate conclusion of the proceedings will
not be reached until well into the 1990's"); Report, Federal Regulation and Regulatory
Reform, House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., (October 1976), at 76.
,1 Testimony of Michael Pertschuk, supra note 11, at 823.
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resources. After a brief two-year investigation and pretrial preparation, the
FTC began to present its case before the administrative law judge assigned
to the matter in 1972. Four years later, the staff rested, and the industry
began its presentation. By 1977, the administrative law judge hearing the
case had reached the civil service mandatory retirement age. By special
employment contract with the FTC, however, he agreed to remain on the
case as an employee of the agency in order to avoid the assignment of a
new judge to the case who would have to rehear five years of trial testi-
mony. The special employment arrangement presented an obvious conflict
of interest by virtue of the employment of the judge by the prosecution,
and a new administrative law judge was appointed in late 1978. During the
following year, the new judge read more than 40,000 pages of trial manu-
scripts in an attempt to avoid repetition of most of the six-year-old trial.
Recently, the problem of managing the big antitrust case was addressed
by the Presidentially-appointed National Commission for the Review of
Antitrust Laws and Procedures (NCRALP, Commission or National Com-
mission). 3 The fact that problems posed by complex litigation have risen
to Presidential notice prompts a hope that they will be tackled more deter-
minedly in the future, even in view of the natural cynicism which greets
the work of most Presidential Commissions. After six months of intensive
study, the Commission issued its report in January 1979.'1 The report
urged the increased use of several pretrial procedural mechanisms to bring
big cases under control. They include: immediate discovery conferences
after a complaint is filed; time limits on discovery; the use of masters to
rule on discovery motions; increased use of partial summary judgment;
interlocutory appeals; and sanctions for dilatory behavior. The report also
highlighted the need for more effective judicial control over discovery,
narrow discovery, and an early identification of the litigable issues.'5
Most of the recommendations in the final report, and many other ideas
discarded by the Commission, had been aired in the past by various com-
mentators.'" Nevertheless, the report focused upon some of the better
suggestions made over the years and there is a strong likelihood that many
of its recommendations will be implemented." However, it must be recog-
,3 Exec. Order 12022, 3 C.F.R. 155 (1977), as amended by Exec. Order 12052, 3 C.F.R.
173 (1979).
11 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATrORNEY GENERAL (Jan. 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
REPORT], reprinted in 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), (Special Supp.) (Jan. 18,
1979).
IS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 27-28, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 11-23.
" Before the Commission began its six-month study, its staff prepared briefing books
which listed and synthesized more than 125 law review articles published over the past 40
years discussing and recommending solutions to complex litigation.
,7 See Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1979, S. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125




nized at the outset that the Commission severely restricted the scope of
its mandate in order to complete its tasks within a six-month time limita-
tion. Its recommendations suffer accordingly.
A serious handicap to the overall credibility and effectiveness of the
Commission Report was the decision to exclude from scrutiny the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the FTC antitrust cases brought under that
Act. That decision conveniently eliminated consideration of the FTC's
mammoth structural cases, Exxon and Kellogg. That threshold decision
also precluded any consideration of whether'FTC antitrust cases instead
should be brought by the Justice Department and/or litigated in the fed-
eral courts, which are clearly better equipped to manage and adjudicate
big antitrust cases than the administrative law judge system used by the
FTC.
The Separate Views of Commissioner Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator
from Utah, deserve careful attention if meaningul progress is to be made
toward resolving some of the inherent institutional defects of the antitrust
enforcement responsibilities of the FTC. Several antitrust litigators unani-
mously testified before NCRALP that the trial of complex antitrust cases
would be materially expedited if the adjudicative functions of the FTC
were transferred to the federal courts. 8 These litigators presented a num-
ber of policy reasons which argue compellingly for transferring the FTC's
antitrust adjudicative functions to the federal district courts. One witness
pointed out that the principal advantage of combining these functions and
eliminating the FTC's authority to initiate administrative adjudicative
proceedings in antitrust matters was to expedite these complex proceed-
ings. According to Mr. William Simon's testimony before the National
Commission:
[T]he record is that even though the federal judges have a case
load of from three to nine times the case load of the administrative
law judges of the Federal Trade Commission . . . the antitrust
cases in the federal courts get tried in roughly one-third the time
that it takes to try them at the Federal Trade Commission."9
The Commission Report expressly declined to take a position on the
critically important issue of duplicative antitrust enforcement and the
constructive suggestions of inany witnesses that antitrust adjudicative au-
thority be transferred from the FTC to the federal courts. It is rather ironic
that the report pleads "time constraints" as the reason it was unable to
fully address this suggestion of how to effectively save time in litigating
antitrust matters."
Soon after the Commission Report was issued, the Antitrust Litigation
IS See Separate Views of Commissioner Hatch, CommssIoN REoRT, supra note 14, at
365-74, 897 ANT RUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 104-07.
It Id. at 369, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 105.
20 It is reassuring to note that Senator Hatch is in the process of preparing legislation to
accomplish the suggested combination of functions in the Department of Justice.
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Committee of the ABA Section of Litigation criticized the Commission for
dodging this issue and strongly endorsed the minority views of the five
members of the Commission who recommended the transfer of the anti-
trust adjudicative function from the FTC administrative law judge system
to the federal courts. The Report of the ABA Committee, adopted by the
full ABA Section of Litigation, noted that such a transfer would have the
twofold effect of expediting FTC antitrust proceedings and eliminating the
appearance of impropriety which results from the combination in one
agency of the investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatorial functions.
Unshacding the FTC from the unwieldy adjudicatory procedures of the
administrative law judge system, the ABA Committee concluded, would
result in an invigoration of FTC antitrust prosecutorial efforts.'
Most recently, on November 6, 1979, Senator Hatch introduced legisla-
tion which would implement the recommendation included in his Separate
Views to the Report of the National Commission. Entitled the "Antitrust
Enforcement Improvements Act of 1979", the bill seeks to accomplish a
transfer of the FTC's antitrust adjudicative function to the federal courts.Y2
S.1980 would amend section 5 of the FTC Act to draw a distinction be-
tween the FTC's "antitrust mission," i.e., protection against unfair meth-
ods of competition, and the FTC's "consumer protection mission," i.e.
protection against unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Under the terms
of the bill, actions with respect to unfair methods of competition would be
instituted and prosecuted by the FTC in federal district court.2 The bill
further provides that actions with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or
practices would continue to be conducted by the FTC in administrative
proceedings.24 As introduced, S.1980 would be applied only prospectively.
21 ABA Antitrust Litigation Committee, Report of the Special Committee for the Study
of the Procedural Recommendations of the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust
Laws and Procedures 8-11 (July 1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE ABA LITIGATION
CoMMrrEE].
2 S.1980, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S.15,926 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1979). The
initial co-sponsors of S.1980 include Senators Cochran, Helms, Laxalt and Thurmond.
n Sec. 201 of S.1980 provide in relevant part:
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe that any such person, partner-
ship, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition in or
affecting commerce, and if it appears to the Commission that a proceeding by it in
respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, the Commission may institute
in its name, through any of its attorneys designated by it for that purpose, a civil
action in a district court of the United States to prevent or restrain such alleged
violation or a threatened violation and pray that the court enter an order requiring
that such person, partnership, or corporation cease and desist from using such
method of competition.
Id.
24 Id. Sec. 202. It perhaps could be argued that the scope of S.1980 is too narrow in that
it would not transfer the FTC's adjudicative function in consumer protection cases. Some
justification for the approach taken in S.1980, however, exists in the fact that empirically it
has been ITC antitrust proceedings that have been notoriously protracted. In addition, the
focus of antitrust on actual competitive effect, as opposed to the generalized approach used
in determining unfairness and deception, requires greater judicial efficiency and control.
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Thus, the legislation would not alter proceedings in which a complaint had
been issued and served prior to the effective date of the bill.
In analyzing S.1980, it should be noted initially that the bill is limited
in scope. It does not seek to eliminate the FTC as an antitrust enforcement
agency.2 Instead, the result of the bill simply would be that federal judges
would perform the adjudicative function which is currently performed at
the FTC by the Commissioners and the administrative law judges. As
indicated in the Separate Views of Senator Hatch and the Report of the
ABA Litigation Section, S.1980 surely would expedite complex FTC anti-
trust proceedings. The enhanced efficiency and effectiveness which would
result from such an adjudicative transfer has been explained by the former
chief complaint counsel in the FTC's Exxon case who noted that by elimi-
nating the Commissioners' dual role of prosecutor and judge, the FTC
would be free to "make the midlitigation policy decisions and-resource
allocations it should now be making under its mandate from Congress.
'2
An additional explanation of -the expediting advantage which would
result from S.1980 is forcefully explained by Senator Hatch.
Experience has shown that administrative law judges at the
Federal Trade Commission cannot maintain the necessary
strength and independence to force FTC complaint counsel to ade-
quately structure and focus their cases. As a result, unless the
adjudicative function is transferred, Federal Trade Commission
antitrust proceedings necessarily will continue to be protracted,
unfocused, and therefore, unduly expensive.Y
The Federal Trade Commission was originally created as a result of
dissatisfaction with perceived delay and inefficiency in court proceedings.
"1 Several commentators have in fact suggested that the dual enforcement authority of
the Department of Justice and the FTC should be centralized in the Department of Justice.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 365-73, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 104-07. Upon leaving the Office of Attorney General, Griffin B. Bell
indicated that based on his experience he would consolidate the antitrust enforcement func-
tions of the FTC and the Department of Justice in one agency. Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1979, at
3, col. 2.
26 White, FTC: Wrong Agency for the Job of Adjudication, 61 ABA JouRNAL 1242, 1245
(1975).
2 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S15,924-25 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1979) (remarks of
Sen. Hatch). This point was expanded upon in the RPORT oio THE ABA LMGATION CommrrrEE,
supra note 21.
A case which could be expected to take three to five weeks to try in a federal court
could be expected to take as many months before an Administrative Law Judge.
There are many reasons for this. FTC law judges have few responsibilities over and
above the one or two cases they handle at any given moment. As a consequence,
FTC staff lawyers are not motivated to develop streamlined procedures. Meaning-
ful stipulations are seldom entered into, and the bulk of a case is often consumed
by arguments regarding the admissibility of documents. Federal judges have heavy
dockets; hence, they are forced by necessity to adopt comparatively superior case
management techniques and are~careful to avoid such time-consuming procedures.
Id. at 9-10.
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For instance, it was argued in 1914 that "[i]f we rely on the judiciary, our
progress must necessarily be slow. We prefer to place our hopes and aspira-
tions in an administrative board, a board that would not be hampered by
appeals, delays and technicalities." Congress believed that an adminis-
trative commission composed of members with expertise concerning the
problems of business competition "could be vastly more effectual than
through the courts alone, which in most cases will take no cognizance of
violations of the law for months or years after the violations occurred
"29
Ironically, the delay and inefficiency which today-surrounds FTC adju-
dicative proceedings is the exact opposite of that which was originally
intended for the FTC. The federal courts, contrary to the myth of adminis-
trative expertise, have been able to develop more flexible procedures for
antitrust cases.30 Accordingly, the expediting advantage of S.1980 would be
consistent not only with current notions of judicial efficiency, but also with
the legislative intent in creating the FTC.
The inherent unfairness of combining investigatory, prosecutory, and
adjudicatory functions in the IKC has long been a serious concern. As
stated in a report of the ABA Antitrust Section:
[For] the FTC Commissioners to retain both the prosecutory and
adjudicatory functions creates the appearance and possibility of
unfairness, even with the best of intentions. It is conceptually
wrong for one tribunal to decide what cases are to be brought, to
prosecute these cases, and then to sit in judgment of these cases."
Former FTC Commissioner Philip Elman has reached the same conclu-
sion, stating that "on the basis of my experience and observations, the
strongest argument I would make against agency adjudication of alleged
violations of law is that the blending of prosecutorial and adjudicative
powers in a single tribunal imposes intolerable strains on fairness."
3 2
Of course, the FTC is not alone among federal agencies in its combina-
tion of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. Empirically, however, the
appearance of prejudgment which results from a combination of prosecu-
torial and adjudicative functions has been exponentially multiplied at the
FTC. With its perceived broad jurisdiction, the FTC may pick and choose
almost any point on the horizon of American industry to insert itself.
Understandably, most parties proceeded against are likely to regard the
FTC as a hostile intruder. When the FTC's structural appearance of im-
23 51 CONG. REc. (Part 9) H9057 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Dillon).
S. REP. No. 597, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1914).
nREPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDy THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Separate
Opinion of Richard A. Posner, at 97 (1969).
1, Report of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law on the Ash Council Report, 507 ANrrusT
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-1 (April 6, 1971).
31 Address by Commissioner Phillip Elman, The Regulatory Process: A Personal View,
475 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (Aug.*18, 1970).
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propriety is added to this already suspicious atmosphere, the result almost
always is a sense of outrage. By seeking to eliminate the FTC's ill-advised
combination of functions, S.1980 goes a long way toward reducing the
perception of unfairness that has engulfed the FTC.
A second fundamental shortcoming of the NCRALP Report was its
government and prosecutorial bias. The concept of a "National" Commis-
sion was conceived by the Department of Justice; the Commission's Chair-
man was the Assistant Attorney General responsible for the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice; the staff was supplied by the Depart-
ment of Justice; and the options papers, white papers and final report were
written by attorneys at the Department of Justice. This was not a Commis-
sion with a mission to critically evaluate the big antitrust cases brought
by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. Indeed,
although the Commission spent a great deal of time lamenting "dilatory"
pretrial tactics by defense counsel, there was no effort whatever to dissect
the root causes of problems within pending government cases-some of
which represent the most complex antitrust cases ever undertaken.,
Nevertheless, the National Commission's efforts in evaluating the big
antitrust case were by no means a useless or academic endeavor. The
report contains many concrete proposals which, if adopted, would go far
toward mastering the complexities of this type of litigation. This article
does not intend to comprehensively critique the Commission Report but
rather identifies two critical aspects of procedural reform-the sine qua
non of manageability-and applies them in ways avoided by the Commis-
sion.
All commentators agree that the most critical factor differentiating
complex but expeditiously resolved antitrust cases from those that bog
down in pretrial or trial complexity is the early identification of the litiga-
ble issues." The crucial nature of this process to the proper management
of a big case prevades the Commission Report.36 The best illustration of
the value of this process is the case of Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,"7 which
13The apparent anti-defendant bias of the Commission's Report was remarked upon by
Senator Hatch in his Address, Spring Meeting of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law (Apr. 6,
1979); and in Sims, Report of the President's Commission on Antitrust, REGULATION 25
(March/April 1979).
31 A mechanism not discussed in this article, but potentially as critical as those dis-
cussed, is partial summary judgment. This can be a most useful means of eliminating peri-
pheral issues prior to trial. Withrow and Larm call summary judgment the "heaviest artil-
lery" of the pretrial system. See Withrow & Larm, supra note 1, at 30. See also, Louis, supra
note 1.
1 For judicial commentary see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 247
(D.R.I. 1964), aff'd except decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966), and United States v. Morgan, 118 F.
Supp. 621, 827-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also, 2 AREEA & TURNER, ANTrrRUST LAW 318 at 86
(1978); Freund, The Pleading and Pre-Tral of an Antitrust Claim, 46 CoRNULI L.Q. 555, 572-
73 (1961); note 1, supra.
11 See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 59-80,897 ANTITRUST & TRDE R G.
REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 17-23; Withrow & Larm, supra note 1, at 42.
11 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
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lasted three years from complaint to decision. The parties in the Telex case
were eager to reach a decision on the merits and, consequently, focused the
dispute on relatively narrow substantive issues. The lack of peripheral
issues in the pleadings was echoed by the lack of diversionary discovery
issues, since Telex was consolidated with two older cases in which the
discovery process was nearly completed. As a result, the case proceeded
quickly to trial and final decision.
The Telex case demonstrates a critical aspect of early issue delineation
passed over by the National Commission and other commeintators. This
process begins not with the pretrial conference but with the preparation
of a properly framed complaint. The Telex complaint was narrowly and
precisely drawn and, unlike the vague complaint in the Federal Trade
Commission's Exxon case, no pretrial litigation was needed to sharpen the
case theory or to identify the facts or behavior about which the plaintiff
complained.
There .are several causes of vague pleadings in complex antitrust litiga-
tion, some of which may be unavoidable but others which are readily
addressed. Uncertainty about all the facts, for example, may cause a plain-
tiff to allege a broad or vague violation of the antitrust laws in order to
encompass all potentially applicable theories of liability. For example, in
Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 8 the plaintiff-retailer filed its
complaint on the sole basis of the defendant-supplier's sudden cessation
of discount pricing in favor of uniform prices for all its customers. The
plaintiff anticipated that post-complaint investigation would uncover the
information it needed to frame its allegations of price-fixing more specifi-
cally.
The lack of clear legal standards in the antitrust field is a second factor
in the problem of vague pleading, especially in Sherman Act section 2
attempt and monopolization claims. The Clayton Act section 7 prohibition
on the "lessening of competition" is another source of unclear standards.
Rule of reason analysis of particular conduct under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act is a third example.
Counsel may also deliberately write broad or vague allegations as a part
of a litigation strategy of postponing the commitment to particular theories
of liability. For these antitrust lawyers, narrowly drawn pleadings hamper
their pretrial litigation maneuvering and provide the bases for successful
objections to their discovery request. Broad or nebulous pleadings, in con-
trast, provide maximum pretrial flexibility and allow counsel to change
their theories of the case in response to emerging fact patterns or the
progress of the case through pretrial motions.
423 U.S. 802 (1975). The reversal by the TenthCircuit was on a point of substantive antitrust
law, not procedural deficiencies. The case was settled in late 1975. See also Withrow & Larin,
supra note 1, at 37.
u 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971), 357 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See also, Furth
& Burns, The Anatomy of a Seventy Million Dollar Sherman Act Settlement - A Law
Professor's Tape-Talk with Plaintiff's Trial Counsel, 23 DEPAuL L. Rsv. 865, 874-75 (1974).
[Vol. XXXVII
PROCEDURAL REFORM
An effort to require that plaintiffs plead claims with particularity was
firmly rejected in the antitrust field during the 1950's.11 Courts and com-
mentators believed that antitrust cases were too complex and relied too
heavily on circumstantial evidence to justify an early dismissal on the
basis of the lack of specificity at the initial stage of the pleadings. Their
preference was to give the parties time to develop their factual cases more
fully before allowing judicial pronouncements on the allegations." Such a
policy was directed to the difficulties associated with the facts of a case,
however, and it was not intended to give plaintiffs more time to develop
their theory of liability or to identify the general practices upon which the
complaint is based. Yet this policy sometimes has resulted in the filing of
complaints which consist merely of conclusory statements of "anti-
competitive behavior."" Occasionally, such complaints not only fail to
mention the specific acts or practices which give rise to the alleged viola-
tions of law, but also, as in the Exxon case, they frequently fail to articu-
late a theory of antitrust liability.
The National Commission's conclusion that the case for specialized
pleadings in the antitrust field is "very weak" is misleading and subject
to severe criticism. 2 Parties who are capable of articulating claims may
resign themselves to broad allegations of monopolization or other antitrust
violations when facts are not sufficiently available to specifically catego-
rize the alleged violation. But parties who deliberately adopt the practice
of vague complaint construction as a litigation strategy should be required
to abandon that strategy and to plead more precisely. Even parties who
confront a vague or poorly defined legal standard can still name that stan-
' The debate on the merits of specialized versus notice pleading raged primarily in the
Second Circuit. Compare Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case", 21 F.R.D. 45 (1957), and
Clark, Comment on Judge Dawson's Paper on the Place of the Pleading in a Proper Definition
of the Issues in the "Big Case", 23 F.R.D. 319, 435 (1958) (favoring notice pleading), with
Dawson, The Place of the Pleading in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the "Big Case", 23
F.R.D. 319, 430 (1958) (favoring more particularized pleadings). Citations of Second Circuit
cases reflecting these two viewpoints can be found in Freund, The Pleadings and Pre-Trial
of an Antitrust Claim, 46 CORsELL L.Q. 555, 556 nm. 8 & 9 (1961).
' See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1110 (1975); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d
414, 420 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Fox Chemical Co. v. Amsoil, Inc., 445
F. Supp. 1355, 1369-60 (D. Minn. 1978); Van Dyke Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F. Supp.
277, 282-3 (E.D. Wis. 1975). But see, Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 223
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 226 F. Supp. 195, 198 (W.D. La. 1964).
1, See, e.g., Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop., 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973).
We recognize that the confused and obscure quality of many of the allegations
of the complaint may understandably have influenced the district court's decision
[to dismiss], particularly since it had granted leave to file an amended complaint.
But the subject matter of the lawsuit is too important to allow such prejudicial
consequences to flow from imprecision in the pleadings.
395 F.2d at 426.
42 COMMUSSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 76 n. 14, 897 ANT=RUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 19 n. 14.
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dard in the complaint and partially point to the practices which they rely
upon in their allegations.
Although antitrust defense attorneys are confronted with litigation
which will cost their clients thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees and may
result in enormous treble damage awards, they are presently restrained
from resorting to procedural mechanisms routinely available to practition-
ers in other proceedings to clarify the nature of a plaintiff's complaint.
Rule 12 motions for a more definite statement, and motions to strike or to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, generally are disfavored, in antitrust
cases. These motions fail because of the belief that specialized pleadings
are unnecessary or unfair in the antitrust field.43 That belief stemmed from
the desire to give antitrust plaintiffs time to develop their factual proofs.
This practice perpetuates the delays inherent in refusing to focus on issues
at the earliest practicable time in complex cases.
It is not unreasonable to require a plaintiff to articulate particular
aspects of a defendant's conduct which suggest antitrust liability, or to
require plaintiff's counsel to consider the dimensions of his case before
filing a complaint. Antitrust cases do involve imprecise legal standards,
but plaintiff's counsel should have an idea of what types of acts or practices
of the defendant he believes comprise that behavior. Certainly, counsel
should be able to discern whether the acts or practices complained of are
conspiratorial or exclusionary in nature, and to so state in the complaint.
If a plaintiff files a nebulous claim, the court should sustain a motion
for a more definite statement to give the defendants notice of the character
of a plaintiff's allegations. Such a motion simply requires a plaintiff to
articulate his case and in no way jeopardizes the policy choice to give the
parties time to amass the factual proofs of those allegations before submit-
ting them to judicial scrutiny. At the same time, it enables defendants to
begin developing their cases and launches the issue identification process
at the earliest possible time.
The federal government has been the chief culprit in initiating massive
antitrust cases on the basis of vague allegations. Structural cases initiated
by the FTC particularly have been infected with a lack of specificity at the
complaint stage. The Commission's massive Exxon case graphically dem-
onstrates the consequences of the broad or vague complaint. That com-
plaint charges the companies with maintaining a "non-competitive market
structure," an unprecedented charge undefined in antitrust law or litera-
" See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1110 (1975); Brett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972);
Walker Distributing Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966); Allied Elec. Supply Co. v. Motorola Inc., 369 F. Supp. 133 (W.D.
Pa. 1973); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
modified, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d. Cir. 1977); Elwonger v. Career Academy, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 85, 86
(E.D. Wisc. 1971); Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148, 153
(D. Minn. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968); 2A MooRE's, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 12.21 (2d ed. 1975).
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ture. Furthermore, the complaint contains no statement of contemplated
relief. As a result, the Exxon case is a paradigm of the horrors visited by
the big antitrust case which is initiated without thorough prior investiga-
tion on the basis of vague theories." From the outset, the FTC's prosecut-
ing staff has been unable to limit or define the legal or factual issues in
dispute or even to state the types of acts and practices in the oil industry
which gave rise to the alleged violation. The vagueness of the complaint
and the absence of any requested relief have resulted in six years of non-
productive litigation, during which respondents have attempted to ascer-
tain not just the basis, but the nature of the FTC's complaint.
The lack of a discernible articulated theory behind the Exxon com-
plaint is, in major part, the result of a cursory and prematurely terminated
investigation of the industry by the FTC staff." Indeed, Commissioner
Paul Rand Dixon, the only present Commissioner sitting when the Exxon
complaint was issued, has testified before Congress that the Exxon com-
plaint was filed before the staff was ready." The lack of adequate pre-
complaint preparation is a root cause of unmanageable government anti-
trust cases. There is no reason for this problem to exist, because unlike
private plaintiffs, government agencies have extensive pre-complaint in-
vestigative authority. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act,"7 the Justice Department has significantly broadened powers
respecting the issuance of pre-complaint civil investigative demands. Like-
wise, the Federal Trade Commission retains wide-ranging authority under
section 6 of the FTC Act to order production of materials pertinent to
ongoing investigations.'" In light of these pre-complaint investigative pow-
ers, there is no excuse for unfocused, ill-conceived antitrust actions initi-
ated by the FTC and the Department of Justice.
The vague pleading in government cases such as the Exxon, Kellogg,
" The current Chairman of the FTC has publicly commented on the FTC's "big case"
problems. Perhaps acknowledging the notoriety of FTC structural cases, he has stated that
antitrust complaints must be precise and narrow in their focus, must be preceded by exhaus-
tive investigation and must specify the remedy to be sought in the event the alleged violation
is proved. Testimony of Michael Pertschuk Before the Subcommittee of Antitrust and Mo-
nopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 3, 1977, at 35. The Chairman has also
emphasized the need for "a very early statement of the issues." Statement of Michael Pert-
schuk Before the Annual Spring Meeting of the Antitrust Law Section of the American Bar
Association, April 7, 1978, at 7-8.
Despite these admonitions, the prosecuting staff of the FTC continues to resist defen-
dants' efforts to identify, much less narrow, the litigable issues.
"The complaint was filed on July 18, 1973, primarily in response to the OPEC oil
embargo. Even though the staff investigation had been initiated in 1963, little in-depth
investigation or analysis had occurred when the oil embargo forever altered international
economic relationships and domestic U.S. politics.
" Testimony of Paul Rand Dixon Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, April 14, 1976, at 16.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976).
4" 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1976).
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IBM and AT&T 9 cases may also be the result of the institutional needs of
these agencies to test new legal theories or to prove the inadequacy of
existing laws, whether or not the agency expects to win the cases. These
same institutional requirements may prompt an agency to file a complaint
in response to public pressures for government action on current political
issues. The result is that such cases are often premised upon popular but
ill-founded suspicions, instead of upon thorough investigation. The mam-
moth government cases seeking to establish the "potential competition"
doctrine as a means of challenging bank mergers under section 7 of the
Clayton Act are excellent examples of this process. 0
Finally, the problems generated by vague government complaints are
not confined to those prosecutions. Private antitrust actions under section
4 of the Clayton Act often follow on the heels of a government complaint.
Where the government complaint is inadequate and vague, so too is the
private complaint. The result is that a corporate defendant's litigation
predicament is compounded by having to face both government and pri-
vate cases, all of which fail to develop theories and issues for shaping later
discovery requests.
As a first step toward expediting complex antitrust cases, sound profes-
sional judgment must be exercised in evaluating which antitrust cases
should be brought. Following the decision to initiate a case, a properly
focused and well-founded complaint must be prepared. Even if the case
seeks to expand antitrust doctrine into uncharted areas, so that the legal
theories around which the complaint is framed cannot be fully announced
at an early stage, it is not too much to require that the government or a
private plaintiff present those theories in understandable form. At a mini-
mum, a plaintiff should be required to point to some facts or behavior
underlying his complaint.
The consensus of the National Commission and perhaps the antitrust
bar is that early issue identification is a prerequisite to big case managea-
bility. There is no practical reason why issue identification cannot begin
with the complaint rather than at some later date. In addition, Rule 12
motions for a more definite statement should be utilized in antitrust litiga-
tion to insure that a complaint which is vague or nebulous may be
amended to give clearer notice of its allegations and their basis.
Without the minimal procedural reforms described above, no other
procedural mechanisms will succeed in making complex antitrust cases
more manageable. Indeed, until a defendant comprehends what substan-
tive charges it must defend itself against, the wisest defense available is
to resist the complaint and the discovery requests on the broadest basis
possible. As a result, the vague complaint itself provides the strongest
incentive for the defensive strategies so often denounced by plaintiffs.
1, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698, [1978-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
62,274 (D.D.C. 1978).
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602
(1974) and cases cited in note 30 of that opinion, 418 U.S. at 627.
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The mechanism of a pretrial conference between opposing counsel and
the judge to define the issues for trial and to plan the trial itself was an
early procedural device for big case management.5' Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a pretrial conference to simplify the
issues and obtain stipulations and admissions of fact when the court, in
its discretion, believes such a procedure helpful. Generally, these confer-
ences occur after discovery is well on its way to completion and the parties
are actively preparing for trial. However, in at least ten federal judicial
districts, a "preliminary" or "initial" pretrial conference is scheduled
immediately after the complaint is filed.2
A fundamental recommendation of-the National Commission involved
amending Rule 16 to provide for an earlier discovery conference of counsel
to discuss the simplification of issues. 3 Important proposed changes to the
5, See 3 MooRE's, FEDERAL PRACTICE 16.02 (2d ed. 1974). An interesting discussion on
the role of the pretrial conference may be found in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 106 F. Supp. 561, 566-74 (D. Del. 1952).
62 E.D. ILL. R. 9(b); S.D. IND. R. 19(d); N.D. IowA R. 18(a)(1) (60 days); D. MONT. R.
11(b); D.N.C. R. 22(a)-(d); D.N.H. R. 10(a) (60 days); N.D. Osno R. 17; E.D. PA. R. 7(b) (45
days); E.D. VA. R. 12(3). The practice is observed informally in Maryland.
U CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 14, at 71-72, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 23.
Proposed Amended Rule 16
(Italics indicate an addition to the current Rule; brackets denote deleted'
material.)
In any action, the court may, in its discretion or upon the request of party,
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences
to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master
for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) The filing of nonbinding statements and counter-statements of
facts and theories of claims or defenses, which shall be used to narrow
issues, guide discovery and prevent surprise, but shall not be admissi-
ble at trial;
(7) The imposition of the sanctions stated in Rule 37(b)(2) against
any party for failure to follow orders entered pursuant to Rule 16;
(8) The submission of a plan and schedule of discovery;
(9) The setting of pretrial time limits, cutoff dates, and a trial date;
(10) [6] Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference,
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, the time limits and cutoff dates set, and
the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which
defines the legal and factual issues and limits the issues for trial to those not
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered
controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent
manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pretrial
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present Rule 16 include the scheduling of a conference or series of confer-
ences at the request of a party as well as the judge and requiring the parties
to file non-binding statements of facts and their theories of the case before
the conference. These statements would then form the basis of decisions
at the conference concerning the central issues, peripheral issues and non-
litigable issues. The statements would guide the parties into the most
relevant areas of discovery and away from frivolous or nonproductive mat-
ters. The purpose of the proposed amendment is to strengthen the district
judge's authority to define issues unilaterally in a pretrial order if the
litigants cannot agree. 4 Due process safeguards against premature or erro-
neous judicial decisions include the provision for reconsideration of such
orders. Under amended Rule 16, an early issue conference would be man-
datory in complex cases within 45 days after filing the complaint.
This particular National Commission recommendation soon may be
incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In February 1979,
the Judicial Conference of the United States published a Revised Prelimi-
nary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. " The changes would amend the provisions of Rule 26 governing the
scope of discovery to add subsection (f). This subsection would provide for
a discovery conference to generate an order tentatively identifying the
discovery issues and describing a plan and schedule for discovery. The
proposed Rule 26(f) specifically provides that this discovery conference can
be combined with a Rule 16 pretrial conference to achieve both simplifica-
tion of issues and a narrowing of discovery.
These proposals for pretrial conferences to narrow the issues and im-
pose a plan upon discovery in complex litigation re-emphasize the value
of an early focus upon issues through a properly framed complaint. If a
plaintiff cannot describe his case in the complaint, it is unlikely that he
will be prepared to discuss the narrowing of the issues 45 days after filing
that complaint. He will certainly be ill-prepared to submit a statement of
the theory of his case if he has not already identified one at the complaint
stage. On the contrary, he will probably resist any attempt to describe as
peripheral or to admit any issue which he has not yet evaluated (or perhaps
even considered). Thus, the value of any pretrial conference in simplifying
the issues in complex litigation may be illusory.
Unless counsel for the plaintiff are prepared meaningfully to discuss
and narrow the issues, the burden of articulating theories for the plaintiff
calendar on which actions may be placed for reconsideration as above provided and
may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to nonjury actions or extend it to
all actions.
Id.
54 Id. at 59-64, 897 ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 17-19 (Man-
datory scheduling of, conference); Id. at 63-64, 897 ANTRUST & TRADE REG. RaE. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 19 (Judicial statement of the litigation issues).
11 Committee on Rules and Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United
States, February, 1979, at 3-5.
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and of identifying the litigable issues devolves upon defense counsel and
the court, the two participants least likely to propound plaintiff's case for
him. The ordinary judicial reluctance to prematurely cut off a party should
certainly operate at its strongest at this early stage of litigation. Should a
court nevertheless assume the initiative and issue a pretrial order defining
the scope of the litigation and/or scheduling discovery, in all likelihood it
will more willingly amend the order and alter the course of the litigation
at a later date in response to a then routine request for reconsideration.
Should this scenario become a common one, the pretrial conference will
serve no useful purpose in expediting the pretrial stages of complex litiga-
tion.
At best, the newly proposed pretrial conference will assist the plaintiff
in identifying issues. At issue here is the preparation of counsel to discuss
the legal, not the factual issues. By assuring that the plaintiffs preparation
occurs before the complaint is drafted rather than before an early pretrial
planning conference, the reform effort assures that parties will approach
the pretrial conference prepared to discuss the proper parameters of the
case and to plan the discovery stage of the litigation. If that occurs, the
conference will play a vital pretrial role. Moreover, this schedule demands
no more of a plaintiff than an early issue conference, particularly one which
would occur 45 days after the complaint is filed.
The management and, tacitly, confinement of discovery were central
goals of the National Commission, and indeed have been addressed repeat-
edly by courts and commentators." Certainly, the adoption of better issue
delineation mechanisms automatically will reduce the dimensions of these
problems. The discovery conference recommended by the Judicial Confer-
ence and the early issue conference proposed by the National Commission
are designed to bypass many of these exhaustive disputes by organizing the
litigation and planning discovery at an early stage, thereby avoiding need-
less discovery on peripheral and uncontested issues. The pre-discovery
conference is also designed to avoid protracted discovery disputes by forc-
ing the parties to prepare their discovery schedules and to resolve their
disagreements over each other's plans before launching and committing
their litigation resources. Any later disputes should be resolved more
quickly by reference to the agreements reached at the pre-discovery confer-
ence and contained in the pretrial order.
The National Commission also considered and suggested (without spe-
cifically endorsing) the use of firm time limits for discovery. A two-year
limit on discovery particularly was favored by-the Commission. Several
local court rules already impose shorter time limits on discovery," but
judges are frequently lax in enforcing these deadlines. The idea behind
timed discovery is that lawyers will eliminate their search for redundant
or marginally useful evidence and other wasteful practices as they are
" See note 1 supra.
'T E.D. N.C. Civ. R. 7(e) (eight months from filing of answer); E.D. PA. R. 7(b)(2); E.D.
VA. R. 12(3)(a); N.D. IND. R. 12(d) (eight months); S.D. TEx. LocAL R. 15(e) (six months).
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forced to "budget" their available discovery time. The National Commis-
sion refrained from the final endorsement of timed discovery because of the
inherent arbitrariness of such limits as well as the suspicion that longer
discovery periods may be unavoidable in many large antitrust cases.
While these mechanisms may successfully organize and manage the
discovery of complex litigation, the adoption of one or both will not auto-
matically simplify and expedite present problems of protracted antitrust
litigation. These are mechanisms which cooperative counsel eager to liti-
gate the merits of -a dispute will willingly embrace. But parties unwilling
or unprepared for various reasons to adapt to these procedures will not. As
pointed out above, the plaintiff who cannot articulate his theory of the case
at the complaint stage will not have clarified the issues in the 45 days
leading to the discovery conference. Likewise, a defendant may be unwill-
ing to clarify the present confusion over legal or factual issues. In the
absence of agreeable counsel, the success of the pretrial conference de-
pends upon the trial judge. In any event, counsel who agreed upon the
issues at the conference are not bound by their pre-conference submissions
to the judge, and they may later request reconsideration of the issues.
Even under the present rules governing discovery and other pretrial
proceedings, an activist judge willing to interject himself into the pretrial
process can readily expedite these processes. His considerable powers
under Rule 16 are purely discretionary in nature. Many judges already
conduct pretrial conferences prior to discovery in order to direct the par-
ties' efforts toward the most fruitful channels. In the final analysis, the
trial judge's attitude toward discovery and his view of his own role in
complex litigation becomes critical to the reform process.
The process of reform is confronted by a forty year tradition of broad
and liberal discovery. This tradition was established by the 1937 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in reaction to the surprise courtroom warfare
which then characterized litigation." To guarantee all litigants a fair trial,
the reformers developed broad discovery in order to insure all relevant facts
were illuminated before the parties go to trial. This bias in favor of wide-
ranging, no-holds-barred discovery continues today. As one court stated:
"[d]iscovery under the Federal Rules, particularly in antitrust cases, is
extremely broad, and not limited to the allegations of the pleadings ....
In antitrust litigation discovery is broadly permitted, and the burden or
cost of providing the information sought is less weighty a consideration
than in other cases." 9 The approach was also adopted by the Manual for
" The Rules are designed to minimize surprise by allowing the parties "to obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 501 (1974).
1, Maritime Cinema Service Corp. v. Movies En Route Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587, 589, 592
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); accord, Goldinger v. Boron Oil Co., 60 F.R.D. 562 (W.D. Pa. 1973). Numer-
ous cases exist in which judges have stated that "discovery rules should normally be liberally
construed to permit discovery in antitrust cases" and that "the burden or cost of providing
the information sought is less weighty a consideration." See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Lukens Steel Co., 444 F. Supp. 803, 805 (D.D.C. 1977); United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D.
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Complex Litigation. At the same time, however, the Rules envision some
reasonable limits upon discovery, particularly Rule 1660 and to a certain
extent Rule 83.1
Pressures for the imposition of some issue-restricted controls on discov-
ery have intensified over time. As early as 1951, The Prettyman Report,
adopted by the Judicial Conference, advocated that the early framing of
issues was critical to the management of complex antitrust litigation and
that such a delineation should serve as "the basis for the bounds of permis-
sible discovery." 2 The 1960 Judicial Conference Handbook of Recom-
mended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases suggested the sched-
uling of a pretrial conference soon after the pleading stage in order to
identify the litigation issues. It recommended that discovery "be confined
to the genuine issues necessary to a decision of the case." While many
courts continue to honor the liberal discovery tradition, others have begun
to limit as well as to organize and guide discovery. These limits have
included those on the subject matter or quantity of inquiries" and those
on the time permitted to the discovery stage."
Fortunately, some federal district judges are beginning to impose inno-
vative procedures designed to narrow issues and limit discovery, even in
complex antitrust cases. A recent example of such judicial activism is
Judge Harold H. Greene's Pretrial Order No. 12 in AT&T."6 That order
required each party to file four successive Statements of Contentions and
Proof over an eighteen month period, each more specific than the last. The
statements would contain each party's factual and legal contentions and
list witnesses and documentary evidence supporting their contentions. The
government was required to file its statement first, with defendant's re-
sponsive statement due shortly thereafter. After each set of statements, a
pretrial conference would be held in accordance with Rule 16 "for the
186, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Prudential New York Theatres Co. v. Radio City Music Hall Corp.,
271 F. Supp. 762, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Rockaway Pix Theatre, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 36 F.R.D. 15, 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
" Rule 16 has been used in several cases to limit discovery, notably in Professional
Adjusting Systems of America, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 1225
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) and United States v. AT&T, No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1978), 862
ANTIRUST & TRiAD Ra. RaP. (BNA) A-4 (17 month discovery schedule established).
" Rule 83 authorizes regulation of litigation "in any manner not inconsistent" with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FD. R. Civ. P. 83.
'1 "The Prettyman Report," Procedure In Antitrust and Other Protracted Cases, 13
F.R.D. 62, 68 (1951).
11 JumciAL CONFERENCE, HANDBOOK OF REcommENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PRO-
TRACTED CAsEs 29, 25 F.R.D. 351, 386 (1960). See also, REPORT OF rIm SPECIAL CoMMTrEE FOR
rE STUDY OF DiscovERY ABUSE (1977) (the scope of discovery should be narrowed to that
"relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses of any party").
" See, e.g., Isi Corp. v. United States, 503 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Marshall v. Ford
Motor Co., 446 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1971); Montecatini Edison S.P.A. v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 434 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1970).
11 Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 145 (8th Cir. 1968); Freehill v. Lewis,
355 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1966).
" 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1343-53 (D.D.C. 1978).
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principal purposes of narrowing and simplifying the issues, arriving at
stipulations of uncontroverted facts, and reducing further unnecessary dis-
covery.""7
The AT&T order balances two competing concerns in the development
of pretrial proceedings. On the one hand, issue delineation is facilitated by
the completion of substantial discovery. On the other, discovery is better
focused and more manageable after meaningful issue delineation has oc-
curred. Judge Greene's concept of judicial control was to proceed concur-
rently with both issue delineation and discovery. He stipulated that dis-
covery would be limited by the issues identified in each statement, and
that issues could not be enlarged in subsequent statements without a
strong showing of good cause, such showing to become progressively more
difficult with each succeeding statement. 8 This procedure is a reasonable
compromise between the competing interests of expediting litigation and
fairness to the parties; it is workable only if accompanied by judicial firm-
ness. 9
Another excellent example of the new, organized approach to big cases
is that of the trial judge in In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petro-
leum Products, Antitrust Litigation, MDL-150, the consolidated cases
brought by several states against the major oil companies subsequent to
the filing of the FTC Exxon complaint. The MDL-150 complaints were
patterned after the government case. Thus, they too consisted of vague
allegations of antitrust liability and were unsupported by recitations of
what specific behavior or practices of the oil companies gave rise to that
liability. Unlike the attitude towards early issue delineation adopted ini-
tially in Exxon, the MDL-150 trial judge insisted that the parties identify
the legal issues before being permitted discovery, stating: "I am appalled
at what might happen if no-holds-barred free ranging discovery were to be
embarked upon."7 The judge ordered a stay of substantive discovery while
the litigants addressed themselves to the specific issues raised by the var-
ious complaints.
The approach toward pre-discovery issue delineation adopted by the
MDL-150 judge recognized the need to keep the discovery within managea-
ble bounds, while assuring the parties adequate pretrial preparation. The
court first sanctioned the defendants' interrogatories seeking clarification
of the issues contended by each plaintiff and required each plaintiff to
respond to these "contention interrogatories" with detailed statements of
the bases for each of the issues asserted in the plaintiffs' respective com-
plaints. In this fashion, the relatively unfocused allegations were crystal-
lized. Next, the court addressed whether the general stay of discovery
11 Id. at 1345.
*' Id. at 1346.
" A similar procedure is presently under consideration in the FTC's ongoing adjudication
of the Exxon case. See Order re Pretrial Schedule, In re Exxon Corp., FTC Docket No. 8934
(issued Dec. 28, 1979).
71 MDL-150, Sept. 26, 1978 Pretrial Conference, at 2.
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should be lifted, and if so, to what extent. The judge's bench remarks
describe precisely the difficult decision of the court in making a complex
case manageable:
Gentlemen, I see another dilemma here. If the plaintiffs have
information that would justify the conclusion that they are on the
trail of a mammoth multilateral conspiracy to violate Section 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act, they are entitled to pursue discovery in
aid of such proof. That is one horn of the dilemma that the court
has to be mindful of. It is inherently costly, and I would try to
control it as best I could, but I would have to allow it to all appro-
priate extent. That is one horn of the dilemma.
The other horn is if the plaintiffs have no more than uncon-
firmed suspicions or hunphes and hope to have discovery so that
they can find something upon which to base a claim, or at least
be able to make it so expensive to the defendants that they will
pay to settle, there is no justification in permitting extensive dis-
covery. That is the other horn of the dilemma.
And the court has a right - an obligation not to allow discovery
to be abused in the latter respect.'
In an effort to resolve this dilemma, the judge required each plaintiff to
submit a detailed statement setting forth: (a) the specific legal theories
upon which the plaintiff based each of its claims; (b) the precise informa-
tion known to support each such legal theory; and (c) what further discov-
ery would be required by each plaintiff to prove each of its legal theories."
Thus, the trial court refused to enter into the discovery phase of the com-
plex litigation until the parties were able to articulate their legal theories,
to found those theories upon some specific fact or information rather than
on mere suspicions, and to describe why they needed the types of informa-
tion encompassed by their interrogatories and document production re-
quests.
Clearly, judges in antitrust cases have developed two polar philosophies
of discovery. One philosophy envisions a wide-ranging and liberal discov-
ery period wherein each party to a lawsuit may discover facts which sug-
gest potential theories of antitrust liability and defense. After sifting those
facts, the parties articulate their strongest legal argufnents and proceed
rapidly to trial. Such an inductive process "sweeps the grounds for all
possible facts and only then considers the legal categories into which they
should be grouped. 7 3 At its worst, this philosophy allows the filing of
complaints such as the FTC Exxon complaint, and necessarily results in
years of pretrial document production, analysis, supplemental documen-
tary discovery and re-analysis. Only after massive outlays by all parties of
MDL-150, Aug. 31, 1978 Pretrial Conference, at 140-41.
72 MDL-150, Order With Respect To Prediscovery Disclosures By Plaintiff, Sept. 28,
1978, at 1-2.
71 Withrow & Larrn, supra note 1, at 42-43.
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time, money and staff resources will the effort to synthesize these facts into
legal arguments begin. In contrast, the discovery process advocated in this
article "takes pre-defined legal principles and attempts to shape the perti-
nent facts to those principles."'" This "deductive" approach elevates the
goal of a fair but efficient resolution of the case above the insulation of a
plaintiff from early pressures to define its case.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge once observed that every reform "will be car-
ried to an excess; that itself will need reforming."75 The free-form discovery
tradition itself began as a reform. The early issue delineation, controlled
discovery approach to big cases carries its own germs of abuse in the form
of due process limitations. That potential for abuse is most apparent in the
use of time limits on the discovery process. Several local federal court rules
already provide for a six or eight month discovery period. Nevertheless, the
element of arbitrariness associated with thb establishment, at the begin-
ning of a complex case, of a finite period of time during which all discovery
must be accomplished discourages their routine use. While a court should
be interested in progressing the case to a prompt resolution, every plaintiff
is entitled to the airing of his well-grounded grievances. Difficulties in
uncovering specific facts to demonstrate the propriety of relief can una-
voidably prolong a discovery case through no fault of the plaintiff. In such
circumstances, to force a plaintiff to go to trial with what evidence he can
uncover in an arbitrarily determined period may precipitate a claim of
violation of due process of law if a court inflexibly adheres to that period.
The issue delineation first, discovery second, pretrial process depends
upon the emergence at a very early stage of relatively precise and definable
legal issues. Some big cases are big because of the size, number or complex-
ity of the parties; for example, class action suits or disputes involving
several major corporations. Others, though, are complex because of the
expansive legal concepts of massive factual proofs at issue. Conspiracy
cases which rely principally upon circumstantial evidence and the reasona-
bleness of inferences drawn from that evidence are examples of the latter.
And, as discussed above, occasionally a plaintiff cannot avoid imprecise
complaint allegations. The full facts may simply not be available to him
until discovery begins and, as a consequence, all available causes of action
may not be known at the complaint stage.
Courts hearing a motion for a more definite statement or preparing for
an early issue conference must be cognizant of the inherent complexity of
antitrust cases and guard against forcing the litigants to choose and then
limit their cases to legal theories which later become too narrow or broad
in light of the full facts. At the same time, they must insist that a party
not come to court until it can articulate at least the events which prompt
the filing of the complaint and a legal theory to support such claims. If a
court concludes after a thorough review of the pleadings and the submis-
74 Id.
15 Quoted in Liman, The Quantum of Discovery vs. the Quality of Justice: More is Less,
4 LIGATION 8 (Fall 1977).
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sions of stated theories and supporting facts that a party may have a
meritorious case despite an imprecise formulation of the issues, the judge
should order very limited discovery to determine whether a basis for the
complaint does exist. Should a party then articulate a case and marshal
some evidence in support of it, a subsequent discovery conference may
develop the appropriate parameters of fuller discovery.
Other due process problems are suggested by the narrowed scope of
discovery being considered in complex litigation. These problems will not
occur if careful attention is paid to the purpose and role of discovery in
litigation. To a considerable extent, the reordering of the pretrial stages of
issue delineation and discovery entails a rewriting of present Rule
26(b) (1)'s scope of permissible discovery. Rather than permitting discovery
regarding any non-privileged matter "relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending action," the revised process would require an identi-
fication of the issues and then a careful restriction of discovery to matters
"relevant to the legal issues" of the case. No due process violations should
occur as long as time period restrictions, subject matter parameters and
geographic limits of discovery are reasonably constrained to the scope of
allegations in the pleadings and, in most cases, to time periods and geo-
graphic areas relevant to the plaintiff's business.
As a practical matter, interrogatories and document requests carefully
limited to the issues of the lawsuit will probably be more effective than the
no-holds-barred discovery presently plaguing some antitrust litigation. As
a legal matter, though, limited discovery ensures that due process-the fair
and orderly administration of the laws-is available to all parties in a
lawsuit, not just the plaintiff on a fishing expedition for facts to suggest a
legal theory. The concept of due process grew out of the same American
suspicion of an interfering government as did the fourth amendment guar-
antees against unreasonable searches and seizures." Unreasonable
searches and seizures, of course, are those unsupported by probable cause
or, at the minimum, articulable suspicions. The same legal caution which
guards fourth amendment protections should apply to the fair and speedy
administration of litigation. Unwarranted and unreasonably broad discov-
ery should be eliminated from that process.
The management of the "big antitrust case" requires first the acknowl-
edgment of a number of realities:
(1) The nature of the case may be so inherently complex that
even early issue delineation will not perform a narrowing or expe-
diting function;
(2) The stakes are high in complex litigation and frequently nei-
71 Striking this same note, Simon Rifkind ironically stated at the 1976 National Confer-
ence on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice that, "A
foreigner watching the discovery proceedings in a civil suit would never suspect that this
country has a highly-prized tradition of privacy enshrined in the Fourth Amendment." See
Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts? 70 F.R.D. 796, 107 (1976).
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ther party is willing to voluntarily adopt a posture to expedite the
case;
(3) Federal district judges are not enamoured, as a rule, with
antitrust cases and frequently permit them to languish on their
dockets while the judges direct their efforts to more readily adjudi-
cated matters; and
(4) Government cases that are "political" in origin will probably
never be precise or easily managed.
Second, it requires the firm rejection of the discovery first, issue delinea-
tion last approach to pretrial preparation. The parties must file pleadings
which, within the constraints of the legal standards at issue, articulate
clear theories of liability and point to at least some specific acts or prac-
tices of the parties which give rise to that liability. Under judicial direc-
tion, the parties must meet at an early date to discuss and identify the
litigation issues and guide their discovery efforts.
Procedural mechanisms such as those proposed by the National Com-
mission on the Reform of the Antitrust Laws will expedite this process.
However, changes in the procedural rules will not automatically bring
about the expedition of big cases. These mechanisms merely codify proce-
dures already in frequent use by trial judges unwilling to preside over
mammoth litigation which wallows in its own complexity. If there is a
solution to the "big case" problem, it will come from the caliber, compe-
tence, commitment, and judicial philosophy of federal district and appel-
late judges. The trial court must be willing to take prompt control of the
complex case and to effectively manage its progress. Firm judicial guid-
ance and continual involvement by the judge in pretrial preparation, and
approval for this involvement by the appellate courts, are essential if these
cases are to become manageable.
Over 100 new federal district judges are being appointed to the trial
bench under the Omnibus Judgeship Bill." If those judges are willing to
assume the heavy responsibility of controlling the parties in complex anti-
trust litigation, there will be progress toward making the complex antitrust
case manageable.
28 U.S.C. § 133 (amended 1978).
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